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OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Robert and Stacey Simon appeal the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment in favor of FIA Card Services N.A. (“FIA”) and Weinstein & Riley, P.S. 
(“Weinstein”), on their claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).  
The Simons claimed that certain communications sent by Weinstein, a law firm 
representing their creditor, FIA, were false, deceptive, and misleading in violation of the 
FDCPA.  The Court rejected their claims, in part, because the communications were sent 
only to their attorney and would not have been misleading to a “competent attorney.”  
Because we conclude that the communications at issue would not have been false, 
deceptive, or misleading even to the hypothetical “least sophisticated debtor”—the 
standard the Simons contend that the Court should have applied—we will affirm the 
order granting summary judgment. 
I. 
                                                 
*   This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 The Simons had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy when, on January 28, 2011, 
Weinstein sent two communications to their bankruptcy attorney.1  Each communication 
consisted of a letter and an attached “Notice of Examination” referencing a Rule 2004 
examination.2  The letter stated that FIA was considering filing an adversary proceeding 
to challenge the dischargeability of the debt, and made an offer of settlement.  The notice 
stated that a Rule 2004 examination had been scheduled to permit FIA to gather 
information for that filing.  Although the notices indicated that they had been mailed to 
both the attorney and the Simons personally, it is undisputed that they were mailed only 
to the attorney.   
 It is likewise undisputed that the notices were subject to the procedural rules for 
subpoenas set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, and that they failed to comply 
with the requirements of the Rule because they were not served on the Simons personally 
and failed to include certain text from Rule 45, now codified at subsections (d) and (e).  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iv).  The Simons moved to quash the “subpoenas,”3 and 
the Bankruptcy Court granted their motion.   
                                                 
1 The communications were identical, except that one was in Mr. Simon’s name, and the 
other was in Mrs. Simon’s name. 
2 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004 provides that a party in interest may 
conduct an examination of the financial condition of a debtor and the debtor’s right to a 
discharge, among other things.  The procedure for compelling the attendance of an entity 
for examination and for compelling the production of documents is governed by Federal 
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9016, which in turn incorporates the requirements of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 for subpoenas. 
3 Because the notices were subject to the procedural rules for subpoenas, the District 
Court and the parties referred to the notices as subpoenas.  We do the same. 
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 In January 2012, the Simons brought an FDCPA action against FIA and Weinstein 
raising several claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, which prohibits the use of false, 
deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of 
debts.  The Simons contended that the communications violated the FDCPA in several 
ways, one of which was that they failed to comply with Rule 45.  The District Court 
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the FDCPA claims were 
precluded by the Bankruptcy Code and that the allegations were insufficient to state a 
claim under the FDCPA.  On appeal, we affirmed in part and vacated in part.  Simon v. 
FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2013) (hereinafter “Simon I”). 
 In Simon I, we concluded that the Bankruptcy Code did not preclude the FDCPA 
claims and that the District Court erred in dismissing the claims for that reason.  We held 
that certain of those claims could move forward, but expressed no opinion as to whether 
the violations of Rule 45 cited by the Simons were actually sufficient to state a claim 
under the FDCPA.  As we stated:  “The District Court dismissed these two remaining 
§ 1692e claims on the basis of preclusion by the Bankruptcy Code, without reaching the 
question whether, if the subpoenas violated Civil Rule 45 and Bankruptcy Rule 9016, that 
was enough to violate the FDCPA.  We will reverse the preclusion ruling without 
resolving whether the alleged failures to comply with Civil Rule 45, as incorporated by 
Bankruptcy Rule 9016, also state claims under § 1692e(5) and (13) of the FDCPA.”  
Simon I, 732 F.3d at 270. 
 On remand, the case proceeded to summary judgment on three issues:  (1) whether 
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defendants violated the FDCPA by failing to serve the subpoenas directly on the Simons, 
as required, and falsely indicating on the subpoenas that they had been mailed to the 
Simons, (2) whether defendants violated the FDCPA by failing to include the text of Rule 
45(d)-(e) as required, and (3) whether FIA qualified as a “debt collector” under the 
FDCPA.  The District Court concluded that the subpoenas’ false representation that they 
had also been mailed to the Simons was not a material misrepresentation and thus was 
not actionable under the FDCPA.  The Court further concluded that the subpoenas’ 
noncompliance with aspects of Rule 45 did not render them violative of the FDCPA 
because the communications were sent only to the Simons’ attorney, and a competent 
attorney would not have been deceived or misled by the procedural defects.  On the third 
issue, the Court determined that FIA was not a “debt collector” and granted summary 
judgment in its favor; this conclusion has not been challenged on appeal.   
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard utilized by the district court.  
Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 416-17 (3d Cir. 2015).  Summary judgment 
is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
III. 
 On appeal, the Simons argue that the District Court erred in applying the 
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“competent attorney” rather than the “least sophisticated debtor” standard to their claim 
that the subpoenas were violative of the FDCPA because they failed to comply with 
certain aspects of Rule 45.  They also contend that the Court erred in determining that the 
subpoenas’ other defect—the fact that they falsely stated that they had been sent to the 
Simons personally—was not material for purposes of the FDCPA, and that the Court 
erred in granting summary judgment because there remained disputed issues of fact.   
  The FDCPA was enacted “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt 
collectors.”  Kaymark v. Bank of Am., 783 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 15 
U.S.C. § 1692(e)).  It is a remedial statute, and we construe its language broadly to effect 
its purpose.  Jensen, 791 F.3d at 418.  In relevant part, the FDCPA provides that “[a] debt 
collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 
connection with the collection of any debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e.  The statute contains a 
non-exhaustive list of conduct that violates § 1692e, including “[t]he threat to take any 
action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken,” and “[t]he false 
representation or implication that documents are legal process.”  Id. § 1692e(5), (13).  A 
debt collector that fails to comply with the statute may be liable to the debtor for actual or 
statutory damages.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k.   
 As a general matter, “we analyze the communication giving rise to the FDCPA 
claim from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor.”  Kaymark, 783 F.3d at 174 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  That is, “we focus on whether a debt collector’s 
statement in a communication to a debtor would deceive or mislead the least 
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sophisticated debtor.”  Jensen, 791 F.3d at 420.  This judge-made standard is objective, 
“meaning that the specific plaintiff need not prove that she was actually confused or 
misled, only that the objective least sophisticated debtor would be.”  Id. at 419.  The 
standard is lower than that of a “reasonable debtor,” id. at 418, and it “prevents liability 
for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices by preserving a quotient 
of reasonableness and presuming a basic level of understanding and willingness to read 
with care.”  Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 993, 997 (3d Cir. 
2011) (quoting Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354-55 (3d Cir. 2000)).  This 
approach is intended to protect “the gullible as well as the shrewd,” and “the trusting as 
well as the suspicious.”  Id. (quoting Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d 
Cir. 2006)). 
 In Jensen, we confirmed that the “least sophisticated debtor” analysis incorporates 
a requirement that a false statement be material in order to be actionable under the 
FDCPA.  As we observed, “[a] debtor simply cannot be confused, deceived, or misled by 
an incorrect statement unless it is material.”  Jensen, 791 F.3d at 421.  A statement is 
material “if it is capable of influencing the decision of the least sophisticated debtor.”  Id.  
In Jensen, for example, a plaintiff alleged that a subpoena was false and misleading, in 
violation of § 1692e, because the subpoena contained an incorrect name on the signature 
line for the clerk of the Superior Court.  This was technically a false statement, but we 
held that it was not actionable because it was not material, i.e., “[i]t could not possibly 
have affected the least sophisticated debtor’s ability to make intelligent decisions.”  Id. at 
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422 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
  In Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364 (3d Cir. 2011), we 
held that a communication from a debt collector to a debtor’s attorney, rather than the 
debtor himself, is actionable under the FDCPA.  Acknowledging a split of authority on 
this issue, we concluded that such communications are actionable because “[a] 
communication to a consumer’s attorney is undoubtedly an indirect communication to the 
consumer.”  629 F.3d at 368.4  We did not directly address the question of whether a 
communication directed to a debtor’s attorney should be analyzed differently from a 
communication to a debtor, although we observed that the Seventh Circuit, in Evory v. 
RJM Acquisitions Funding, L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 774-75 (7th Cir. 2007), had held that 
such communications were to be “analyzed from the perspective of a competent attorney” 
rather than the “least sophisticated debtor.”  Allen, 629 F.3d at 366. 
 Citing Evory and other decisions,5 the District Court applied a “competent 
attorney” standard, rather than the “least sophisticated debtor” standard, to certain of the 
Simons’ claims, because the communications had been sent to the Simons only indirectly, 
through their attorney.  We need not address whether the Court erred in applying this 
                                                 
4 The FDCPA’s definition of “communication” is “the conveying of information 
regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692a(2) (emphasis added). 
5 The Seventh Circuit’s “competent attorney” standard has also been endorsed by the 
Eighth Circuit, see Powers v. Credit Management Servs., Inc., 776 F.3d 567, 574 (8th 
Cir. 2015), and some district courts within our Circuit have applied the standard as well 
(mainly pre-Allen). 
9 
 
“competent attorney” standard, however, because we conclude that the Simons’ FDCPA 
claims fail even under the less stringent “least sophisticated debtor” standard, for which 
they advocate.  We turn our focus, therefore, to the familiar “least sophisticated debtor” 
analysis. 
 The Simons contend that the subpoenas contained a false statement (the statement 
that they had been sent to the Simons personally), and an omission (required language 
from Rule 45) that rendered the communications deceptive and misleading in violation of 
the FDCPA.  We disagree.  Although the statement that the subpoenas had been sent to 
the Simons personally was technically false, it was not material, and is not actionable, 
because it could not have had an impact on the Simons’ decision with respect to their 
debt.  See Jensen, 791 F.3d at 420-21 (summarizing Hahn v. Triumph P’ships. LLC, 557 
F.3d 755, 757-58 (7th Cir. 2009)).   
 With respect to the omission of text from Rule 45(d)-(e), the subpoenas were 
technically incomplete without that text, but the omission did not render them false, 
deceptive, or misleading, even to the least sophisticated debtor.  More specifically, the 
absence of this text did not render any statements in the subpoena to be false, nor did 
anything in the subpoenas contradict the provisions of Rule 45(d)-(e) such that a debtor 
would be misled or deceived into believing that the procedural safeguards of the Rule did 
not exist or did not apply.  In other words, while the subpoenas did not affirmatively set 
forth the text of Rule 45(d)-(e), neither did they contradict it in any way that would 
mislead even an unsophisticated debtor.  
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 The Simons’ main argument appears to be that the subpoenas’ noncompliance 
with Rule 45 rendered them unlawful, such that they falsely purported to be valid, but 
were in fact unenforceable.  In other words, they contend that “the subpoena falsely 
represented itself to be a valid legal document, when it fact it was an invalid legal 
document,” see Jensen, 791 F.3d at 422, and argue that the unenforceability of the 
subpoenas would not have been clear to the least sophisticated debtor.  We rejected a 
similar argument in Jensen, and conclude that in this case, as well, the subpoenas’ failure 
to comply with Rule 45 in certain respects did not render them false, deceptive, 
misleading, or otherwise violative of the FDCPA.  Simply put, an unsophisticated debtor 
would not have been led astray. 
 The Simons argue that the subpoenas constituted an “attempt to pressure [them] 
into paying the debts rather than submit to an onerous deposition on a workday in another 
state,” and contend that they “might have been misled to believe that they were obligated 
to attend a deposition in New York.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 8, 18.)  The communications 
themselves, however, made clear that the Simons were not necessarily obligated to attend 
an out-of-state examination.  The subpoenas stated, on their face, that the examinations 
could take place “at an alternate location to be agreed upon by the parties,” (App. 59, 64) 
and the accompanying letters suggest that Weinstein offered to hold an informal 
telephone conference in lieu of the examination.  (See App. 58, 63 (“My office would 
gladly discuss with your client whether the matter can be resolved . . . and/or to 
reschedule it for an informal telephone conference at a mutually agreeable time prior to 
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the bar date.”).)    Moreover, as the District Court observed, “there is no allegation that 
Defendants were not legally entitled to seek a Rule 2004 examination, only that the 
subpoena used in the attempt to effectuate the examination fell short of certain procedural 
requirements.”  (Id. at 16.)  This is key, confirming that the subpoenas did not contain a 
“threat to take [an] action that cannot legally be taken,” in violation of § 1692e(5), 
because they described an action that legally could be taken.  They also did not violate 
§ 1692e(13), which prohibits “[t]he false representation or implication that documents are 
legal process,” because they were actual legal notices, albeit with procedural defects.6   
 Finally, the Simons argue that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment because there remained genuine issues of material fact with respect to an 
additional claim, specifically their claim that Weinstein had no intention of actually 
conducting an examination and that this was part of an intentional pattern and practice of 
the firm.  They contend that they raised this issue before the Court when they stated, in 
their opening brief at summary judgment, that “To the extent that the Court is not 
inclined to grant summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff requests the 
opportunity to conduct discovery.”  (App. 236.)  As Weinstein points out, however, the 
Simons never formally requested discovery and never challenged defendants’ statement 
of undisputed material facts.  A scheduling order issued by the Court on August 5, 2014 
required the Simons to report to it by October 6, 2014 if discovery was needed to respond 
                                                 
6 We express no opinion on whether a document purporting to be a subpoena could be so 
grossly procedurally deficient as to run afoul of this subsection.  Suffice it to say, this is 
not such a case. 
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to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment; the Simons never did so.   
 We conclude that the Simons waived this final argument in opposition to the grant 
of summary judgment by having failed to present it “with sufficient specificity to alert the 
district court.”  See Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 418 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting an 
argument raised on appeal given only a “fleeting reference” to the argument in a brief 
opposing summary judgment).  
IV. 
 We will affirm the order of the District Court granting summary judgment in favor 
of FIA and Weinstein. 
